Written by: Marc Lauritsen
Will AI make law better?
Yes.
For whom?
For many on both sides of the legal profession’s moat.
I’ll be brief.
(If you’re looking for verbosity, see my other writings. Links to some decorate this one.)
Written by: Marc Lauritsen
Will AI make law better?
Yes.
For whom?
For many on both sides of the legal profession’s moat.
I’ll be brief.
(If you’re looking for verbosity, see my other writings. Links to some decorate this one.)
Written by Alistair Simmons and Matthew Rostick | Edited by Josh Lee Kok Thong
In recent months, many jurisdictions in the Asia-Pacific (“APAC”) have adopted or are considering various forms of AI governance mechanisms. At least 16 jurisdictions in APAC have begun some form of AI governance, and this number will likely continue to increase. This paper scans the different AI governance mechanisms across a number of APAC jurisdictions and offers some observations at the end.
This paper segments AI governance mechanisms into four categories: Direct AI regulations are enforceable rules that regulate the development, deployment or use of AI directly as a technology, and consequently have regulatory impact across multiple sectors. Voluntary frameworks cover voluntary and non-binding guidance issued by governmental entities that directly address the development, deployment or use of AI as a technology. Indirect regulations (data & IP) are also enforceable legal rules but do not regulate the development, deployment or use of AI directly as a technology. They are rules of more general applicability that nevertheless have an impact on the development, deployment or use of AI. As the scope of this category is potentially broad, we have focused on data protection/privacy and intellectual property laws in this paper. Sector-specific measures refers to binding and non-binding rules and guidelines issued by sector regulators that are relevant to the development, deployment or use of AI in an industry. To avoid getting bogged down in the specifics of whether the rules and guidelines are technically binding or not, we have presented them together. Unlike the mechanisms addressed in the Sectoral Governance Mechanisms segment, the non-binding frameworks in this segment typically address the use of AI across multiple sectors.
For avoidance of doubt, this paper addresses legal governance mechanisms only. There may be other initiatives afoot to drive alignment and good practices from a technical perspective. We do not seek to address technical measures in this paper.
Written by Victoria Rui-Qi Phua | Edited by Josh Lee Kok Thong
We’re all law and tech scholars now, says every law and tech sceptic. That is only half-right. Law and technology is about law, but it is also about technology. This is not obvious in many so-called law and technology pieces which tend to focus exclusively on the law. No doubt this draws on what Judge Easterbrook famously said about three decades ago, to paraphrase: “lawyers will never fully understand tech so we might as well not try”.
In open defiance of this narrative, LawTech.Asia is proud to announce a collaboration with the Singapore Management University Yong Pung How School of Law’s LAW4032 Law and Technology class. This collaborative special series is a collection featuring selected essays from students of the class. Ranging across a broad range of technology law and policy topics, the collaboration is aimed at encouraging law students to think about where the law is and what it should be vis-a-vis technology.
This piece, written by Victoria Phua, puts forward an argument for attributing electronic personhood status for “strong AI”. According to her, algorithms trained by machine learning are increasingly performing or assisting with tasks previously exclusive to humans. As these systems provide decision making rather than mere support, the emergence of strong AI has raised new legal and ethical issues, which cannot be satisfactorily addressed by existing solutions. The ‘Mere Tools’ approach regards algorithms as ‘mere tools’ but does not address active contracting mechanisms. The ‘Agency’ approach treats AI systems as electronic agents but fails to deal with legal personality and consent issues in agency. The ‘Legal Person’ approach goes further to treat AI systems as legal persons but has drawn criticism for having no morality nor intent. To address the legal personality in strong AI, Victoria proposes to extend the fiction and concession theories of corporate personality to create a ‘quasi-person’ or ‘electronic person’. This is more satisfactory as it allows for a fairer allocation of risks and responsibilities among contracting parties. It also holds autonomous systems liable for their actions, thereby encouraging innovation. Further, it facilitates the allocation of damages. Last, it embodies the core philosophy of human-centricity.
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